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DEBATE ON THE US TAX REFORM AND
THE EU ATAD
Can GILTI + BEAT = GLOBE?
Mindy Herzfeld*
The OECD is moving forward with consideration of a minimum tax as part of its solution to taxation of the digital economy. Part of a template
for such a minimum tax may be the version enacted by the United States (US) in 2017 as an expansion of its Controlled Foreign Corporation
(CFC) regime, known as Global Intangible Low Taxed Income (GILTI). But the OECD version will undoubtedly be different from the US
iteration. It’s likely that it would also include some aspects of a minimum tax being proposed by other OECD members such as Germany and
France, namely a tax on outbound payments, in addition to a CFC-type regime. The United States also enacted an outbound minimum tax in
2017, known as Base Erosion Anti-Abuse Tax (BEAT). The two-part minimum tax being pursued by the OECD – a minimum tax based on a
CFC regime plus an outbound minimum tax that’s a variation on the BEAT – has been referred to as GLOBE (global anti erosion) (See S. Soong
Johnston, Germany, France Explore GLOBE Proposal to Tax Digital Economy, 92 Tax Notes Int’l 782 (2018)).
This article summarizes the two features of the US 2017 tax reform (known as the Tax Cuts & Jobs Act (TCJA) (The formal name is The
Act to Provide for Reconciliation Pursuant to Titles II and V of the Concurrent Resolution on the Budget for Fiscal Year 2018, Pub. L. No.
115–97.)) that may be incorporated into a global minimum tax, namely GILTI and BEAT, from the perspective of how such provisions might be
adapted to work in a global setting. It considers the challenges to taxpayers and policy makers raised by the US law as enacted, and the attempts in
recently issued regulatory guidance to address some of these concerns. It compares and contrasts the provisions enacted by the US Congress with a
number of parallel European developments, including the EU Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive (ATAD)’s CFC rules and the German royalty
deduction barrier.
Adaption of the minimum tax components of the Tax Cuts & Jobs Act for worldwide use will require careful understanding of the policy
choices, as well as the mistakes made, by the TCJA drafters in designing the regime, in order to ensure that they are not repeated.
1 FROM A CFC REGIME TO A MINIMUM TAX?
1.1 ATAD CFC Rules
In 2016 the EU agreed on a council directive including a
number of tax anti-avoidance measures that member
countries are required to implement.1 The directive, gen-
erally known as ATAD, obligates countries to implement
various anti-avoidance measures, including CFC rules,
which are supposed to be effective by the beginning of
this year.
The CFC rules are described in Article 7 of the
Directive, which gives member countries a choice between
two alternative CFC regimes, both of which are specifi-
cally targeted at tax avoidance. As a threshold matter,
paragraph 1 of Article 7 sets out the conditions under
which the CFC regime will apply. It requires Member
States to treat an entity (or a non-taxed permanent estab-
lishment) as a controlled foreign company of a resident
taxpayer in situations where both of the following condi-
tions are met: (a) the taxpayer (either by itself or together
with its associated enterprises) holds a direct or indirect
participation of more than 50% of the voting rights,
capital, or profits of an entity; and (b) the actual corporate
tax paid on its profits by the entity (or permanent estab-
lishment) is lower than the difference between the corpo-
rate tax that would have been charged by the Member
State of the taxpayer and the actual corporate tax paid.
Paragraph 2 of Article 7 sets out two alternative ways
in which member countries can design their CFC regimes.
Under the first alternative, once an entity qualifies as a
CFC of a taxpayer, the taxpayer’s Member State includes
in the tax base certain specified types of income, namely:
(i) interest or any other income generated by financial
assets;
(ii) royalties or any other income generated from intellectual
property;
Notes
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1 EU Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive (ATAD): Council Directive (EU) 2016/1164 of 12 July 2016 laying down rules against tax avoidance practices that directly affect the
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(iii) dividends and income from the disposal of shares;
(iv) income from financial leasing;
(v) income from insurance, banking and other financial
activities;
(vi) income from invoicing companies that earn sales and
services income from goods and services purchased
from and sold to associated enterprises, and add no or
little economic value.
There’s a significant exception to this general rule, which
would otherwise appear to require immediate inclusions of
income of passive or mobile income of a CFC into the
shareholder’s current taxable income, similar to US sub-
part F rules. No inclusion is required in situations in
which the CFC carries on a substantive economic activity
supported by staff, equipment, assets and premises, as
evidenced by relevant facts and circumstances. The direc-
tive also says that where the CFC is located outside the
EU, this exception need not apply.
Member States can allow for two other exceptions to
this CFC regime – they can opt not to treat an entity as a
CFC if one third or less of the income accruing to the
entity is of the ‘bad’ types of income. Member States can
also opt not to treat financial undertakings as CFCs if one
third or less of the entity’s income from the ‘bad’ cate-
gories comes from transactions with the taxpayer or its
associated enterprises.
Under the second alternative, the taxpayer’s resident
state looks to whether the non-distributed income of the
CFC arises from non-genuine arrangements which have
been put in place for the essential purpose of obtaining a
tax advantage. The directive says that an arrangement or
series of arrangements is regarded as non-genuine to the
extent that the entity or permanent establishment would
not own the assets or would not have undertaken the risks
which generate all, or part of, its income if it were not
controlled by a company where the significant people
functions which are relevant to those assets and risks are
carried out and are instrumental in generating the con-
trolled company’s income.
If adopting this second alternative, Member States can
exclude from the scope of the regime entities with
accounting profits of no more than EUR 750,000 and
non-trading income of no more than EUR 75,000; or
entities that have accounting profits of no more than
10% of their operating costs.
As this brief summary of the ATAD’s guidance on CFC
regimes indicates, the EU is uniquely focused on tax
avoidance in designing the guidelines for Member States
for this purpose. For example, under the first
alternative – which targets passive income – the regime
may only apply when there is no substantive economic
activity taking place. And under the second approach,
sometimes referred to as the ‘transfer pricing’
approach – the EU is focused on a CFC’s profits that
may be better described as properly attributable to the
parent’s activities, as well as the purpose of obtaining a tax
advantage.
Many EU member countries have chosen the less
restrictive choices for enacting CFC regimes. Ireland,
for example, has introduced CFC rules that adopt the
second approach, attributing to the parent company
undistributed income of the CFC that arises from non-
genuine arrangements put in place for the essential
purpose of obtaining a tax advantage.2 Belgium, in
adopting its CFC rules, followed a similar approach.3
And Luxembourg made a similar choice in its initial
adoption of CFC rules.4
1.2 GILTI
GILTI, which can be characterized as a significant expan-
sion of the US CFC regime, has but a few points of
similarity with the EU ATAD’s CFC guidelines. If the
GILTI minimum tax concept is expanded to include all
OECD members, including EU member countries, the
following parallels and variances will need to be consid-
ered and addressed.
1.2.1 Ownership Threshold
One of the few parallels between the GILTI regime and
the EU’s CFC rules is the threshold at which they become
relevant – both require a 50% ownership stake by the
resident taxpayer before the rules begin to apply. But
there the similarity ends. For even with a 50% ownership
stake, the ATAD CFC rules only apply if there is a
significant disparity between the tax rate of the 50-per-
cent-owned entity and the resident taxpayer. The US
GILTI regime, in contrast, explicitly does not require an
analysis of the foreign effective tax rate before it applies
(although the foreign tax rate is implicitly relevant by
virtue of the fact that the US resident taxpayer is allowed
a foreign tax credit against inclusions of GILTI).
Even the 50% ownership threshold – in theory one of
the simplest aspects of the US CFC regime – has raised
numerous interpretive questions in the United States.
Regulations issued by the IRS and Treasury in
September try to address some of these questions, such
Notes
2 See IE: Explanatory Memorandum to Ireland Finance Bill 2018, https://data.oireachtas.ie/ie/oireachtas/bill/2018/111/eng/memo/b11118d-memo.pdf (accessed 31 Jan. 2019).
3 See Loyens & Loeff, The Introduction of CFC Legislation in Belgium (29 Dec. 2017), https://www.loyensloeff.be/en/news/the-introduction-of-cfc-legislation-in-belgium/
(accessed 31 Jan. 2019).
4 See PwC Luxembourg, ATAD 1 – Luxembourg Parliament Votes to Approve Transposition into Luxembourg’s Tax Laws (19 Dec. 2018), https://www.pwc.lu/en/newsletter/2018/
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as how to apply existing subpart F rules that provide
guidance to taxpayers as to how to allocate a CFC’s sub-
part F income among different shareholders, to share-
holders’ calculations of GILTI.5
For example, under the pre-TCJA subpart F regime,
enacted in the 1960s, the US regulations have applied
robust and complex rules for determining the timing of a
shareholder’s inclusion of subpart F income, and how
much of the subpart F income of a CFC a shareholder
should include into taxable income when, for example, a
CFC has more than one owner, or more than one class of
shares outstanding. But these rules needed revision to
work for the GILTI regime. That’s because while subpart
F is solely an entity (CFC) level calculation, GILTI
requires a netting of different CFCs ‘tested income’ and
‘tested losses’ at the US shareholder level (as discussed in
greater detail below).6 On this point, the proposed reg-
ulations provide that the rules in the current regulations
(which require a pro rata allocation of subpart F income)7
generally apply, with modifications to account for the
differences between subpart F income and the GILTI
regime. The proposed regulations also address questions
taxpayers had been asking about how to calculate GILTI
inclusions in the case of CFCs owned through partner-
ships, or where shareholders own preferred stock in the
CFC.8 Similar to the determination of a US shareholder’s
pro rata share of subpart F income, for example, Prop.
Reg. § 1.951A-1(d)(1) provides that a US shareholder’s
pro rata share of any item of income of a CFC item
necessary for calculating its GILTI inclusion amount is
determined by reference to the stock the shareholder owns
as of the close of the CFC’s taxable year, including stock
treated as owned by the US shareholder through a domes-
tic partnership.
Because the GILTI rules also require an allocation of
losses from CFCs with ‘tested losses,’ rules are required to
tell taxpayers how to perform these allocations as well. On
this point, the proposed regulations provide that in gen-
eral, the tested loss is distributed solely with respect to
the CFC’s common stock.9 But in cases where the com-
mon stock has no liquidation value, the proposed regula-
tions provide that any amount of tested loss that would
otherwise be distributed in the hypothetical distribution
to the class of common stock is instead distributed to the
most junior class of equity with a positive liquidation
value to the extent of the liquidation value.10 This raises
more questions – what happens in future years, when the
same CFC has tested income, and how to allocate such
tested income among the different classes of stock.11
These and other modifications of prior subpart F alloca-
tion rules are intended to ensure that the tested loss of a
CFC is allocated to each US shareholder in an amount
commensurate with the economic loss borne by the share-
holder by reason of the tested loss.
The calculation of GILTI also requires a calculation and
allocation of what the statute refers to as ‘tested interest
expense’ and ‘tested interest income;’ in order to help
taxpayers apply these rules, Treasury and the Internal
Revenue Service (IRS) had to develop rules providing
taxpayers with guidance as to how to perform these new
calculations as well. Prop. Reg. § 1.951A-4 defines tested
income, and Prop. Reg. § 1.951A-1(d)(5) and (6) provide
rules for determining a shareholder’s pro rata share of
‘tested interest expense’ and ‘tested interest income.’
As the above summary of some of the questions
addressed by new proposed regulations indicates, the
new GILTI regime enacted by the US is not a simpli-
fication of prior subpart F rules. Making these rules
work for a larger group of countries could be a challen-
ging exercise.
1.2.2 Tax Rate Threshold
As mentioned above, the US GILTI regime does not
explicitly factor in the foreign tax rate in the determina-
tion of whether the rules apply; instead, every foreign
subsidiary is potentially subject to having its earnings
included as GILTI. Nonetheless, the GILTI regime does
effectively take the foreign tax rate into account because
(with a big caveat) it will only subject to additional US
tax foreign income that is taxed below a certain rate, due
to the existence of the US foreign tax credit.12 In theory,
the GILTI regime would only apply to tax foreign earn-
ings of subsidiaries that are subject to a domestic tax rate
of below 13.125%. That number is a function of two
features of the GILTI regime: (i) the US rate imposed on
GILTI earnings (equal to ½ the US standard corporate
rate of 21%) and (ii) the fact that the US foreign tax credit
Notes
5 US: REG-104390–18; 2018–43 IRB 67.
6 US Code s. 951A(c).
7 US: Treas. Reg. § 1.951–1(b) and (e).
8 US: Prop. Reg. § 1.951A-1(d)(2). For a thorough list of questions raised by taxpayers on how to interpret the GILTI statutory provisions, see New York State Bar Ass’n Tax
Section, Report on the GILTI Provisions of the Code, Report No. 1394 (4 May 2018), https://www.nysba.org/Sections/Tax/Tax_Section_Reports/Tax_Reports_2018/1394_
Report.html (accessed 31 Jan. 2019).
9 US: Prop. Reg. § 1.951A-1(d)(4)(i) – (iii).
10 US: Prop. Reg. § 1.951A-1(d)(4)(iii).
11 US: Prop. Reg. § 1.951A-1(d)(2)(ii).
12 See US Code ss 901, 904, and 960.
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on GILTI earnings is limited to 80% of foreign taxes paid
on those earnings.
This principle is not truly sound, however, once some
other features of the US foreign tax credit regime – as
revised by the TCJA – are considered. The US foreign tax
credit has always operated to limit a taxpayer’s ability to
claim the credit to – very simplistically – the US tax rate
that would be imposed on the taxpayer’s foreign earnings,
a principle known as the foreign tax credit limitation.
And in order to prevent taxpayers from using high taxes
paid on active earnings to offset lower taxed passive earn-
ings, this limitation has applied by way of a set of ‘bas-
kets’. Immediately prior to passage of the Tax Cuts & Jobs
Act, there were two baskets (at various times in the
history of the foreign tax credit there have been up to
nine baskets), a passive basket and a general basket. The
TCJA introduced two new baskets, the foreign branch
basket and the GILTI basket. As a result, taxes paid on
earnings that are includible in income of the US share-
holder as GILTI can’t be credited against taxes paid on
other types of foreign earnings, and vice versa.
Furthermore, taxpayers are not allowed to fully credit
taxes paid on GILTI earnings, but only 80% of such
taxes paid. And to add another twist, foreign taxes attri-
butable to GILTI earnings can’t be carried forward or back
if not fully utilized in the year of the inclusion. In other
words, taxpayers either have enough GILTI earnings to
soak up any credits for taxes paid on GILTI earned in the
current year, or such credits are lost.
The US foreign tax credit rules add another nuance that
make the limitation system even more complicated to
apply. They require that some types of shareholder level
expenses – the most common one being interest, but also
R&D, be allocated not just to the jurisdiction where
incurred (i.e. the United States), but to the calculation
of foreign source earnings as well.13 In other words, if a
US corporation has USD100 of interest expense in the
current year, and 100% of its earnings are foreign source,
all of the interest expense is allocated against the foreign
earnings. What this means is that even if the foreign
jurisdiction imposed a 13.125% corporate income tax
rate, there would be insufficient foreign earnings against
which to fully credit (at an 80% credit allowance) the
foreign taxes paid on those earnings. The IRS and the US
Treasury have begun the process of trying to modify the
old system of allocating deductions for foreign tax credit
purposes to the new regime in a set of regulations that was
released in December.14 The regulations required the
Treasury to make a series of judgment calls concerning
the fisc. As taxpayers clamoured for breaks in the expense
allocation rules, Treasury’s willingness to accommodate
these requests would translate directly into lower revenue
from the GILTI regime.
The ATAD’s CFC guidelines neither acknowledge nor
anticipate any of the complexity of the type that is asso-
ciated with the US foreign tax credit regime. But expand-
ing the US CFC regime to encompass most headquartered
companies’ foreign earnings will necessarily put more
pressure on determination of foreign tax rates. Questions
of the type the United States has wrestled with in drafting
the GILTI regime – and is still trying to resolve – will
inevitably be raised.
1.2.3 Type of Income Earned
Under the first of two alternative CFC regimes permitted
by the ATAD guidelines, the resident shareholder is
required to include in income certain types of passive
income earned by the CFC (as described in detail above).
Most of these categories of passive, or mobile income
closely resemble income that would generally be required
to be included as foreign personal holding company
income under US subpart F rules as in effect prior to
enactment of the TCJA. However, the directive also
allows member countries to incorporate important excep-
tions to application of this regime: for one, it says that
this rule can be applied in a way so as not to require any
inclusion when the CFC carries on a substantive economic
activity supported by staff, equipment, assets and pre-
mises. Second, the directive says that countries can write
the rules to say that companies won’t qualify as CFCs if
one third or less of the entity’s income from the categories
comes from transactions with the taxpayer or its associated
enterprises. In other words, countries can write the rule to
apply only to companies that don’t carry on much sub-
stantive activities.
The GILTI regime, in contrast, mostly makes any
analysis as to the type of income earned by the CFC
irrelevant in the determination of whether there will be
a GILTI inclusion. All income of the CFC, with a few
enumerated exceptions, is considered ‘tested income’
and therefore potentially includible in the US share-
holder’s income as GILTI.15 Also not required is any
calculation as to the extent the entity is engaged in
substantive activity, or the percentage of income earned
from passive or ‘bad’ transactions. The shareholder of a
CFC with nothing but good active income could still be
required to include its earnings into income on a cur-
rent basis.
Nonetheless, the numerated exceptions to GILTI
ensures that a calculation of whether the entity earns
Notes
13 See generally US Code ss 861–65 and s. 904, and regulations thereunder.
14 US: REG-105600–18; 83 F.R. 63200–63266 (7 Dec. 2018).
15 The definition of ‘tested income’ generally means ‘the gross income’ of a CFC, with specific items of income excluded. See US Code s. 951A(c)(2)(A).
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‘bad’ income remains necessary. One of the exceptions to
‘tested income’ is income that qualifies as subpart F
income16; Subpart F income, while also taxed currently
to the US shareholder, differs from GILTI inclusions in
that it is taxed at the full statutory rate, and inclusions of
subpart F income carry with them 100% of attributable
foreign taxes paid. Income that is excluded from the
definition of subpart F income because it is ‘high-taxed
income’ under section 954(b)(4) is also excluded from
tested income.17 High-taxed income is defined in the
Internal Revenue Code as income subject to an effective
foreign tax rate greater than 90% of the maximum US
corporate tax rate, currently equal to 18.5%. Such excep-
tions to the definition of ‘tested income’ means that
determination of the type of income earned by the CFC
as well as the tax rate imposed on different items of
income remains a relevant consideration for taxpayers
attempting to calculate their GILTI inclusions.
The only way to remove such types of consideration
from and thereby simplify the regime completely would
be to no longer attempt to differentiate between passive
income – generally categorized as easily shifted to low- or
zero taxed jurisdictions – and active income. But doing so
would run counter to competing goals, namely of ensur-
ing that any comprehensive minimum tax regime was
sufficiently robust in protecting against base erosion and
profit shifting.
1.2.4 Subjective v. Objective Tests
The second option under the EU ATAD directive for
member countries to utilize in implementing a CFC
regime looks to whether the arrangement had a tax avoid-
ance purpose. This option would impose tax on a base of
income that arises from ‘non-genuine arrangements which
have been put in place for the essential purpose of obtain-
ing a tax advantage.’ The directive provides guidance for
when an arrangement is considered ‘non-genuine,’
explaining that arrangements are considered non-genuine
‘to the extent’ that the CFC wouldn’t ‘own the assets’ or
wouldn’t have ‘undertaken the risks’ that generate all or
part of its income, if it were not controlled by a company
‘where the significant people functions, which are relevant
to those assets and risks, are carried out and are instru-
mental in generating the controlled company’s income.’
As such, this second option includes both a subjective
element – what was the taxpayer’s purpose? And an
objective one – to what extent is the CFC reliant on
other group members’ asset/employees in carrying out its
activities?
The EU CFC guidelines are in sharp contrast to the
GILTI regime on this point, which renders a tax avoid-
ance purpose irrelevant. Also irrelevant under the
GILTI regime is the question of the people functions
undertaken by the CFC or other related parties, and
questions as to whether any of those functions should be
considered ‘significant,’ or ‘instrumental,’ or ‘relevant’
in generating specific items of income. In removing
subjectivity and transfer pricing economic analysis
from consideration, GILTI vastly simplifies a CFC
regime and makes it much more robust in capturing
all low-taxed income.
1.2.5 Exempted Return
One of the most complicating features of the GILTI
regime results from the fact that it specifically doesn’t
attempt to include 100% of CFCs earnings into the share-
holder’s income. Instead, it builds in an exemption for a
fixed (10%) return on the tangible (depreciable) assets of
the CFC. The calculation required to compute the excess
of a CFC’s positive tested income over its return on fixed
assets is extraordinary complex in part because it is per-
formed at the shareholder level; this requires netting and
adding of different CFCs’ qualified business asset invest-
ment (‘QBAI’) on a consolidated level. Providing US
parent companies with such an exemption was deemed
politically and even economically necessary in the United
States, and harks back to a 2013 proposal made by US
Treasury economist Harry Grubert and Roseanne
Altshuler of Rutgers University.18 In that article, in
which Grubert and Altshuler proposed a minimum tax
as a solution to the challenges facing the US international
tax system, they also proposed allowing CFCs a deduction
for ‘real investment in the country’ from the minimum tax
base. Their goal was to tax only the excess return on CFCs’
assets, and ensuring zero US tax on the CFC’s normal
return earned overseas. Similar proposals for exempting
from variations on a minimum tax a ‘normal’ return on
tangible assets were also included in proposals made by
Republican members of Congress19 and by the Obama
administration.20
Notes
16 US Code s. 951A(c)(2)(A)(i)(II). Unless otherwise noted, all ‘section’ references herein are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended, and all ‘Treas. Reg. §’ references
are to the Treasury regulations promulgated thereunder.
17 US Code s. 951A(c)(2)(A)(i)(III).
18 H. Grubert & R. Altshuler, Fixing the System: An Analysis of Alternative Proposals for the Reform of International Tax, 66 Nat’l Tax J. 671, 677 (2013).
19 See H.R. 1 – Tax Reform Act of 2014, 113th Cong., 2d Sess. (2014) and Jt. Comm. on Tax’n, Technical Explanation of the Tax Reform Act of 2014, A Discussion Draft of the
Chairman of the House Committee on Ways and Means to Reform the Internal Revenue Code: Title IV – Participation Exemption System for the Taxation of Foreign Income, JCX-15–14 (26
Feb. 2014).
20 US: White House and Treasury, The President’s Framework for Business Tax Reform: An Update (Apr. 2016).
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In the GILTI regime, this exempt return is calculated
as follows – each CFC’s investment in ‘good’ tangible
assets – its Qualified Business Asset Investment – is
determined.21 Then a return of 10% on each CFC’s
QBAI is calculated. From this amount must be subtracted
an amount of the CFC’s interest expense that’s relevant in
determining the entity’s tested income for the tax year.22
The result – the Net Deemed Tangible Income
Return – is a shareholder level attribute. But not all net
deemed tangible income return (NDTIR) of each CFC is
relevant for ultimately determining the shareholder’s
GILTI. Only NDTIR from entities with positive tested
income is taken into account in the GILTI calculation.23
The exemption for a fixed return on tangible assets
introduces multiple levels of complication. First,
whether an individual item of property may qualify
needs to be determined. Second, its basis needs to be
calculated on a quarterly basis. Third, the calculation
needs to be aggregated at the shareholder level. Both
taxpayers and policy makers in the United States are
beginning to question whether providing for this
exemption is truly worth all the complications it intro-
duces into the GILTI computation, given that the lar-
gest share of corporate profits is derived from
intangible, rather than tangible, assets. In the United
States, the exemption for NDTIR has also faced opposi-
tion from those arguing that it incentivizes taxpayers to
invest in tangible assets overseas, rather than in the
United States. To that end, a number of Democrats in
Congress have introduced bills that would eliminate
this exemption.24
The EU CFC directive allows Member States to reflect a
similar exception in their CFC regimes, providing that
CFCs’ income can be excluded from the second alternative
regime if their accounting profits amount to no more than
10% of operating costs for the tax period. But the GILTI
regime is exponentially more complex in this regard.
1.2.6 Netting of Income and Losses
Most CFC regimes operate on a per-entity basis – an
entity is either a CFC or its not, and its income is either
includible or it’s not. The EU’s ATAD contemplates such
a regime, and the US subpart F rules operate in that
manner as well.
The GILTI regime discards the separate entity concept
in several important respects. In calculating the GILTI
inclusion, a shareholder’s net tested income – from all
CFC’s with positive tested income – is aggregated at the
shareholder level.25 There, it is netted against any net
tested loss – or the deficit in earnings of any CFCs with
tested losses. The netting of CFCs with tested income
against CFCs with tested losses somewhat mitigates the
harshness of a minimum tax regime; without such net-
ting, shareholders would be required to include in income
currently the income of profitable foreign subsidiaries,
with no allowance for losses incurred. But it also signifi-
cantly complicates the regime, for a number of reasons.
First, it requires a mechanism for determining how much
of a CFC’s losses were utilized. Second, it means that other
calculations – such as how much of a foreign tax credit is
utilizable – must be determined at the shareholder level as
well. Finally, it mandates the existence of a tracking
regime for taxpayers to keep track how much of a CFC’s
positive tested income was actually included at the share-
holder level.
For countries without tax consolidation in their domes-
tic laws, performing such a netting will be even more
complex than it is in the United States. But an alternative
for an expansion of a CFC regime into a minimum tax
regime that also preserves the fundamental income tax
principle of allowing profits to offset losses in a given
tax year is not readily apparent.
1.2.7 Calculating the Minimum Tax
Yet another complicating feature of the GILTI regime is
that it doesn’t simply impose a fixed rate of tax on the
CFC’s tested income. Instead, in order to provide for a
lower effective tax rate on foreign earnings, it allows for a
deduction of 50% of GILTI income.26 This again impli-
cates the need for a shareholder level calculation, and the
introduction of an entirely separate set of shareholder level
complications into the regime – such as the interaction of
the deduction for GILTI with the new interest expense
limitation and deductions for net operating losses.
The EU ATAD directive appears to contemplate that
the rate imposed on CFC income will be the same as the
general statutory rate. But this is not necessarily an opti-
mal path to follow when trying to impose a minimum tax
Notes
21 US Code s. 951(d). Determining this amount requires analysing the tangible assets to determine whether they meet the threshold criteria of ‘specified tangible property,’
determining the basis of such assets, and determining the average of such basis at the end of each quarter of the tax year.
22 The effect of this formulation is to count against net deemed tangible income return only a US shareholder’s pro rata share of interest expense allocable to gross tested income
to the extent that the related interest income is not also reflected in the US shareholder’s pro rata share of the tested income of another CFC, such as in the case of third-party
interest expense or interest expense paid to related US persons.
23 US Code s. 951A(b).
24 See e.g. H.R. 5145, the Close Tax Loopholes That Outsource American Jobs Act, 115th Cong. (2018) introduced by Rep. Rosa L. DeLauro, D-Conn.
25 US Code s. 951A(a), (c); Prop. Reg. § 1.951A-1(c)(2).
26 US Code s. 250 (the deduction is reduced in 2026 to 37.5%).
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on all foreign earnings. One important lesson from the US
GILTI regime could be that simply imposing a lower rate
of tax, rather than allowing a deduction, could signifi-
cantly simplify the regime.
1.2.8 Previously Taxed Income
Finally, yet another serious complicating factor of the US
GILTI regime is introduced by the feature that provides
for the tracking of previously taxed income (‘PTI’).27 The
US subpart F regime had always had such a feature,
necessary to ensure that undistributed profits that had
previously been taxed at the US shareholder level
wouldn’t be taxed again when repatriated. To get a
sense of the complexity of the US PTI rules, a quick
review of Internal Revenue Service Notice 2019–01 is
helpful; that notice provides new guidance for tracking
PTI post-TCJA according to the rates at which such
income was taxed, now accounting for two different tax
rates provided for by section 965 (the one-time repatria-
tion tax) in addition to rates on subpart F income and the
lower rate on GILTI (as well as other categories). The US
PTI rules haven’t been updated substantially since first
issued in the 1960s; although the IRS issued proposed
regulations in 2006 to try and answer some questions that
had been open for decades, these proposed regulations
themselves raised so many questions that they were
never finalized.
Although the system for tracking PTI was always seen
as complex, it was also understood to be necessary in a tax
regime where dividends paid to US shareholders from
CFCs were subject to tax at the regular corporate rate; it
was also less burdensome when the previously taxed prof-
its of CFCs represented only a small portion of CFCs’
earnings. Post-TCJA, where dividends from CFCs are
entitled to a 100% dividends received deduction, its less
clear why such a system is really needed.28
Nonetheless, both taxpayers and the Treasury and IRS
see two important reasons why tracking PTI remains
necessary: first, to ensure that withholding taxes payable
upon distributions of PTI are creditable (the repeal of
section 902 would otherwise preclude taxpayers from
claiming any foreign tax credit upon the distribution of
a dividend) and calculating and recognizing any fluctua-
tion of currency exchange rates between the time of the
inclusion and the time of distribution. But there are other
mechanisms – undoubtedly simpler – that could be used
for ensuring that credits associated with distributions of
PTI are creditable, without having to track 16 different
categories of PTI.
2 THE OUTBOUND MIN TAX
Adoption of a truly worldwide minimum tax cannot rely
solely on a tax on resident shareholders of foreign entities
in the form of a CFC regime. In order to protect against
base erosion and against inversions – or headquarter com-
panies decamping to the lowest taxed jurisdiction – an
effective minimum tax at the source needs to be imple-
mented. The US attempted a comprehensive approach to
addressing outbound base erosion with enactment of the
new BEAT rule, enacted in 2017 as section 59A of the
Internal Revenue Code, which adopts a separate tax
regime that subjects to additional tax all types of out-
bound deductible payments to related parties once certain
specified thresholds have been met. But a simpler and less
comprehensive version of an outbound tax has been imple-
mented by Germany also in 2017, known as the royalty
deduction barrier. Unlike the US approach, Germany’s
approach only targets a limited type of payments.
The proposal under consideration by the OECD will
likely fall somewhere between the two different regimes
in terms of comprehensiveness and complexity.
2.1 German Royalty Barrier
Effective 2018, Germany introduced a limitation on
deductibility of certain royalty payments. Under this
regime, deductibility of payments from a German com-
pany to a foreign related party is limited in cases where
the payment benefits from a preferential regime not in
compliance with action 5 of the base erosion and profit
shifting (BEPS) action plan, which imposed a substantial
nexus requirement on patent boxes that grants a prefer-
ential rate of tax on income derived from intellectual
property.29 The threshold for relatedness here is fairly
broad, at 25% ownership stake, and the regime defines a
harmful tax regime as one where the taxation of royalties
differs from the general taxation of income in that jur-
isdiction, and the tax rate on royalty revenue is less than
25%. The limitation on deductibility doesn’t apply in
cases where the recipient’s income is already subject to
tax in Germany under Germany’s CFC regime.
2.2 BEAT
GILTI and BEAT, which each constitute substantial mod-
ifications of the US international tax regime resulting
from the TCJA, are in some respects mirror images of
each other. While the GILTI can be characterized as a
minimum tax on resident companies’ foreign profits, the
Notes
27 See e.g. US: IRS, Notice 2019–01, 2019–3 IRB 1.
28 US Code s. 245A.
29 See M. Greinert et al., The Nexus Approach in Practice: Germany’s New License Barrier Rule and Switzerland’s Special Cantonal Tax Regimes, 90 Tax Notes Int’l 339 (2018).
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BEAT operates in a converse fashion, ensuring that US
companies’ domestic earnings are subject to a minimum
level of tax. BEAT and GILTI are similar in that they
both try to take the subjective element out of what have
generally been designed as tax avoidance rules, by apply-
ing the tax once specific bright-line criteria have been
met, regardless of a taxpayer’s tax-avoidance purpose.
Similarly, BEAT and GILTI both mostly disregard the
character of income and the recipient’s tax rate in deter-
mining whether the threshold for applying the tax has
been met.
In many other respects, however, the new outbound tax
enacted as BEAT is functionally different from the way
GILTI operates. As explained in detail above, GILTI is
mostly built on the existing edifice of the US subpart F
regime, albeit that it introduces a myriad of new concepts
that requires substantial fine-tuning of its rules to ensure
compatibility with existing systems. BEAT, in contrast,
introduces an entirely new calculation in the form of an
alternative minimum tax that includes in its tax base
otherwise deductible base eroding payments. Unlike
GILTI, the entire set of rules that gives rise to the
BEAT tax is fundamentally new and different from any-
thing previously existing in the Internal Revenue Code as
a tax on outbound payments. As a result, it required
introduction of a whole new set of terms and calculations,
each of which has given rise to interpretive questions and
many of which don’t function well within pre-existing
rules. In part, the complications inherent in the BEAT are
due to the fact that while US policy makers had been
considering and analysing a minimum tax in the form of a
CFC regime for close to a decade before enactment of the
TCJA, the proposal for the BEAT, in contrast was sprung
on the US business and policy community just six weeks
before Congress passed the TCJA. The discussion below
highlights just a few of the tensions and questions these
new terms and required calculations have given rise to.
Interpretation of these provisions will impose challenges
on taxpayers and the Internal Revenue Service for years, if
not decades, to come. And it may well be the case that the
US Congress will need to step in to fix some of the most
egregious errors involved.
The BEAT essentially functions by requiring taxpayers
to calculate an alternative minimum tax base, on which is
imposed a separate, additional, tax, to the extent that the
taxpayer has met a threshold for base eroding payments (a
defined term) to foreign related parties. To implement
this tax, a number of new terms and concepts are required.
For example, the BEAT only applies to an ‘applicable
taxpayer’ whose gross receipts exceed a specified threshold
(USD500 million). Even this seemingly simple test has
given rise to numerous questions, in part because ‘gross
receipts’ is not a term that has previously had much
relevance in the US tax system, which has mostly relied
on concepts of taxable income rather than gross receipts.
There is not a lot of case law interpreting this term. Other
types of questions have arisen regarding application of this
threshold test, such as: whose gross receipts matter? How
does one calculate gross receipts in the case of payments
made between persons who might be considered related?
Should revenue generated by foreign persons count in
determining whether the gross receipts test has been
met? How to calculate gross receipts generated by a
partnership in which a US company owns an interest? In
proposed regulations issued last December, the IRS and
the Treasury tried to provide some clarity to these terms
for section 59A purposes.30
For example, the term ‘applicable taxpayer’ as used in the
statute isn’t really utilizable by taxpayers attempting to
apply the statute. That’s because it seems to include foreign
corporations generally and also doesn’t account for payments
between related domestic companies. To address these issues,
the proposed regulations (Prop. Reg. §1.59A-2) define an
applicable taxpayer as a corporation (other than certain spe-
cified corporations) treated as one person for purposes of
determining whether a taxpayer satisfies the gross receipts
test, and provide that foreign corporations will be treated as
outside of the controlled group for purposes of applying
aggregation rules (except to the extent that the foreign
corporation has effectively connected income). Otherwise,
according to the preamble to the proposed regulations, pay-
ments made to a foreign related corporation are not inap-
propriately excluded from the base erosion percentage
test – a circular result that clearly would have been at odds
with the statute. As Treasury’s generous interpretation of the
statutory language suggests, the statute as enacted was sim-
ply not workable on a standalone basis.
The proposed regulations clarify that payments
between members of the aggregate group generally are
not included in the gross receipts of the aggregate group,
and are also not taken into account for purposes of the
numerator or the denominator in the base erosion percen-
tage calculation. But the proposed regulations also need to
consider how to treat payments to a foreign corporation’s
US branch, which are not carved out by the statute. The
result of not carving these payments out would have been
that otherwise deductible payments made to a person that
is subject to US corporate income tax would then be
subject again to the BEAT minimum tax. To solve this
problem, the proposed regulations explain that payments
to a foreign corporation from within the aggregate group
that are subject to net income tax in the United States are
eliminated and not taken into account in applying the
gross receipts test and the base erosion percentage test.31
Notes
30 See US: REG-104259–18; 83 F.R. 65956–65997; 2019–2 IRB 300.
31 US: Prop. Reg. § 1.59A-2(e).
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Similarly, the proposed regulations provide that in the
case of a foreign corporation, the gross receipts test only
takes into account gross receipts that are taken into
account in determining income that is subject to net
income tax as income effectively connected with the con-
duct of a US trade or business or in determining net
taxable income under an applicable US income tax
treaty.32
What about if the group undergoes changes during the
year? It would be rare for a large multinational company
not to see at least a few members joining or leaving the
group in any given year. The proposed regulations
attempt to address that situation, providing that gross
receipts of a taxpayer are measured by reference to the
taxpayer’s aggregate group determined as of the end of the
taxpayer’s taxable year for which BEAT liability is being
computed.33 Rules for computing gross receipts for enti-
ties that have been in existence for fewer than three years
(the statute requires a look-back with an average of the
three-year prior period) are also provided. Many challen-
ging interpretive questions arise when there are entities
taxable as partnerships, or flow-throughs, in a multina-
tional group. The proposed regulations provide that if a
member of an aggregate group owns an interest in a
partnership, the group includes its share of the gross
receipts of the partnership in its gross receipts computa-
tion, and that the aggregate group’s share of the gross
receipts of the partnership is proportionate to its distri-
butive share of items of gross income from the
partnership.34
Once the gross receipts threshold has been met, the
BEAT still won’t apply unless a taxpayer’s ‘base erosion
payments’ paid to foreign related parties exceed a specified
threshold amount (generally 3%, except for certain finan-
cial services companies, for whom the threshold is only
2%) – referred to as the ‘base erosion percentage.’35 What
constitutes a ‘base erosion payment’ also requires defini-
tion, as does the denominator of the equation (generally
defined as the taxpayer’s tax deductions for the taxable
year, but excluding certain deductions such as for net
operating losses (NOLs), the section 245A deduction for
foreign dividends, section 250 deductions for GILTI and
foreign derived intangible income (FDII), certain pay-
ments for services, and deductions for certain qualified
derivative payments). If all of these conditions have been
met and the taxpayer is one to whom the BEAT applies,
the taxpayer is required to compute its ‘modified taxable
income’ and then apply the BEAT tax rate (currently
10%) to the amount by which the modified taxable
income exceeds the normal tax base.
Under the statute, the term base erosion payment is
generally defined to mean any amount paid or accrued by
the taxpayer to a foreign person which is a related party of
the taxpayer and with respect to which a deduction is
allowable, and also includes any amount paid or accrued
by the taxpayer to a foreign person which is a related party
of the taxpayer in connection with the acquisition by the
taxpayer from such person of property of a character sub-
ject to the allowance for depreciation (or amortization in
lieu of depreciation).36 An exception is provided for pay-
ments for services, in cases where the services are services
that generally meet the requirements for eligibility for use
of the services cost method under section 482, and the
amount constitutes the total services cost with no markup
component.37
The statutory description of the payment for services
exception gave rise to lots of questions as to its scope. If a
payment for services exceeded the cost, was the entire
payment invalidated as meeting the exception, or just
the excess? The numbers at stake were significant, and
the statute on its face appeared to invalidate the whole
amount. The preamble to the proposed regulations noted
that under one interpretation of section 59A(d)(5), the
services cost method exception does not apply to any
portion of a payment that includes any markup compo-
nent. Under another interpretation, the exception is avail-
able if there is a markup, but only to the extent of the
total services costs. Under the former interpretation, any
amount of markup disqualifies a payment, in some cases
resulting in dramatically different tax effects based on a
small difference in charged costs. In addition, if any
markup were required, for example because of a foreign
tax law or non-tax reason, a payment would not qualify for
the services cost method exception.38 The proposed reg-
ulations provided taxpayers with a favourable answer here,
saying that deductions for payments made to foreign
related parties that qualify for the services cost method
under US transfer pricing rules are not treated as base
erosion payments.39
In general, for a payment or accrual to be treated as a
base erosion payment, the recipient must be a related
foreign person, and a deduction must be allowable with
Notes
32 Ibid.
33 US: Prop. Reg. § 1.59A-2(d).
34 US: Prop. Reg. § 1.59A-7.
35 US Code s. 59A(d) defines a base erosion payment. US Code s. 59A(c)(4) defines a base erosion percentage.
36 US Code ss 59A(d)(1), (d)(2).
37 US Code s. 59A(d)(5).
38 US: Prop. Reg. § 1.59A-3(b)(3)(i).
39 US: Prop. Reg. § 1.59A-3(b)(3).
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respect to the payment or accrual. Section 59A(f).
Treasury adopted a similar approach to excluding within
the scope of this definition amounts that are treated as
effectively connected income by the foreign recipient, and
include an exception from the definition of base erosion
payment for amounts that are subject to tax as income
effectively connected with the conduct of a US trade or
business, as well as payments taken into account in deter-
mining net taxable income under the treaty, as it did in
connection with defining the gross receipts test.40
One big problem built into the BEAT’s mechanics and
calculation, not addressed by the proposed regulations, is
the possibility (indeed likelihood) of double taxation when
both the GILTI regime and BEAT regime apply simulta-
neously. Unlike the German royalty deduction barrier, the
BEAT provides no exception from the base eroding pay-
ments definition for payments that are includible into US
taxable income as a result of the application of GILTI at the
shareholder level. In addition, foreign tax credits don’t help
taxpayers in determining the amount of their BEAT mini-
mum tax liability; in fact, they generally operate to cause
taxpayers to be subject to a greater BEATminimum tax. As
a result, the possibility of double taxation of US share-
holders’ foreign income resulting from outbound payments
made by members of a US consolidated group is persistent.
As this brief summary of just a few of the interpretive
issues that have arisen over the newly enacted BEAT has
demonstrated, the comprehensive BEAT regime – which
attempts to include within its scope almost all outbound
payments of a US persons to foreign related parties – is
likely not one that should be copied by other countries.
But while the German royalty deductive barrier may be a
simpler model to follow, its lack of breadth may mean
that it fails a comprehensive anti-base erosion test and
leaves too many loopholes if the OECD preference is for
adoption of a worldwide minimum tax. In addition,
because the German rule requires that taxpayers perform
a calculation and analysis of the tax treatment of the
payment overseas, it is in some respects more complicated
than the BEAT regime, which like the GILTI regime, is
supposed to render such types of analyses irrelevant and
unnecessary. But while the BEAT tried to make these
types of analyses irrelevant, in doing so it introduced a
separate regime of extraordinary complexity and also sig-
nificantly increased the possibility of double taxation. The
mirror of a stripped down and simplified GILTI on the
outbound payment side would appear to be something in
between the US BEAT and the German royalty deduction
barrier – more comprehensive than a rule that requires
examination of the recipient’s tax regime, but less com-
prehensive than a rule like BEAT that’s overly broad in
scope.
As noted by Johann Becker and Joachim Englisch of
Munster University, adoption of an outbound mini-
mum tax – a tax that limits the deductibility of out-
bound payments to foreign related persons in
conjunction – enacted in conjunction with a compre-
hensive CFC/minimum tax regime should be well coor-
dinated with priority rules to avoid ‘double minimum
taxation’. Becker and Englisch raise the possibility that
allocation of responsibilities among countries as out-
lined in the hybrid mismatch report in BEPS Action 2
could serve as a blueprint for how to avoid or minimize
the likelihood of double taxation.41 But adoption of
such a priority rule on a broad and comprehensive
scale – as would be needed if countries worldwide
adopted minimum tax regimes – would seem to require
more coordination among countries’ tax regimes than
currently appears possible.
3 CONCLUSION
Adaptation of the US international tax rules enacted in
the TCJA to apply a minimum tax broadly and glob-
ally will require (i) simplification and modification of
the GILTI rules; (ii) a narrowing of the BEAT rules;
(iii) a means of coordinating between the two. In
addition, work would need to be done to ensure com-
patibility of any such regime with the EU freedoms.
Much technical work remains to be done before GILTI
and BEAT can be translated into a GLOBE tax applic-
able worldwide, and if the types of interpretive and
complex calculations currently being wrestled with by
US taxpayers are to be minimized worldwide.
Notes
40 US: Prop. Reg. § 1.59A-3(b)(3)(iii).
41 Tax Justice Network, The German proposal for an effective minimum tax on multinational’s profits (15 Jan. 2019), https://www.taxjustice.net/2019/01/15/the-german-proposal-for-
an-effective-minimum-tax-on-multinationals-profits/ (accessed 31 Jan. 2019).
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